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The insurance industry has so far relied on historical data to develop and price
weather insurance contracts. In light of climate change, we examine the effects of this
practice in terms of the hedging effectiveness and proﬁtability of insurance contracts.
We use simulated crop and weather data for today’s and future climatic conditions
to derive optimal weather insurance contracts. We assess the hedging effectiveness
and proﬁts of adjusted contracts that are designed with data that accounts for the
changing distribution of weather and yields due to climate change. We ﬁnd that,
with climate change, the beneﬁts from hedging with adjusted contracts almost triple
and expected proﬁts increase by about 240%. Furthermore, we investigate the effect
on risk reduction (for the insured) and proﬁts (for the insurer) from hedging future
weather risks with non-adjusted contracts, which are based on historical weather and
yield data. When offering non-adjusted insurance contracts, we ﬁnd that insurers
either face substantial losses, or generate proﬁts that are signiﬁcantly smaller than
proﬁts from offering adjusted insurance products. Non-adjusted insurance contracts
that create proﬁts in excess of the proﬁts from adjusted contracts cause at the same
time negative hedging beneﬁts for the insured. We observe that non-adjusted con-
tracts exist that create simultaneously positive proﬁts and hedging beneﬁts, however
at a much larger uncertainty compared to the corresponding adjusted contracts.
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1 Introduction
Climatechangecausesshiftsinaverageweatherconditionsandanincreaseintheweather
variability due to changes in the frequency and occurrence of extreme events.1 Some of
the extreme weather events that occurred between 2001 and 2010 exceeded already in in-
tensity, duration, and geographical extent the most signiﬁcant historical events on record
(WMO, 2011). Evidence is mounting that with climate change, the frequency of heat-
waves is increasing, for instance, Stott et al. (2004), Beniston (2003), Meehl and Tebaldi
(2004), Schaer et al. (2004), Fischer and Schaer (2010).2 As a consequence, the return
period of events like the pan-European heatwave of 2003 are becoming shorter.
Agricultural production, as well as many other industrial sectors, are sensitive to
changes in climatic conditions. An increase of prolonged drought-like conditions, caused
by higher temperatures or more frequent heatwaves, has implications for the productiv-
ity of the agricultural sector. Scientiﬁc evidence, showing that climate change shifts the
mean and variance of crop yields, is accumulating. The effect of changes in climatic vari-
ables on mean crop yields has been studied widely (Reilly et al., 2002; Deschenes and
Greenstone, 2007; Schlenker and Roberts, 2009). The year-to-year change in climatic con-
ditions is found to be a major determinant of crop yield ﬂuctuations (Mearns et al., 1992;
Olesen and Bindi, 2002; Chen et al., 2004; Isik and Devadoss, 2006; McCarl et al., 2008).3
Climate change thus makes agricultural production more risky (IPCC, 2001; IPCC, 2007),
and without risk management less proﬁtable.4 Consequently, agricultural insurance so-
lutions become more important to protect against a climate change induced increase in
weather-related losses.
The changing occurrence and frequency of extreme weather events implies, however,
that historical return periods underestimate the likelihood of agricultural losses in the
future. In the context of water-resource risk management, Milly et al. (2008) were the
ﬁrst to note that “climate change undermines a basic assumption that historically has
facilitated management of [...] risks.” Risk analysis and management relied on the as-
1According to IPCC (2007), is is very likely (90 − 99% probability) that there will be higher maximum
temperatures, more hot days, higher minimum temperatures, fewer cold days, and more intense precipi-
tation events over many land areas. It is likely (67 − 90% probability) that there will be increased summer
drying over most mid-latitude continental interiors and associated risk of drought.
2Stott et al. (2004) ﬁnd an increased probability of hot summers like the 2003 heatwave. Stott et al. (2004)
state that it is very likely that human inﬂuence on climate has doubled the current risk of a heatwave such
as the one that occurred in 2003, compared to preindustrial times.
3 Mearns et al. (1992) investigate how climate variability affects agricultural production. The authors
ﬁnd that increases in variability of temperature and precipitation result in signiﬁcant increases in yield
variability and that precipitation changes have an even more pronounced effect.
4The pan-European heatwave of 2003 caused, for example, uninsured crop losses of around USD 12.3
billion (Schaer and Jendritzky, 2004).
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sumption that distributions are stationary over time in order to estimate return periods of
weather-related events.5 In the context of agriculture, McCarl et al. (2008) examine histor-
ical crop yield data and ﬁnd that the stationarity assumption is no longer valid. McCarl
et al. (2008) conclude that risk analysis in light of climate change requires to use dis-
tributions with non-stationary means and variances along with possibly shifting higher
order moments. In conclusion, future agricultural losses cannot be predicted any longer
by extrapolating historical trends of weather and yield data.
Insurershavehistoricallyprovidedinsurancesolutionsforweather-relatedlosses, and
are going to play an integral role for society to cope with the consequences of climate
change. Weather-related insurance losses have increased in recent years, according to
Mills (2005), much faster than non-weather related events.6
The insurance industry started to pay attention to the implications of climate change
for their business (Lloyds of London, 2006; Hawker, 2007; Clemo, 2008; Maynard, 2008;
Dlugolecki 2008; Mills, 2009). Traditionally, insurers have used historical data to design
and price insurance products.7 However, as noted by Hawker (2007) “a changing cli-
mate has the potential to reduce the insurance industry’s capacity to calculate, price, and
spread weather-related risk.” Therefore, according to Mills (2009) “insurers’ traditional
modeling techniques are ill-suited for understanding the implications of climate change
...”. Only within natural catastrophe modeling, insurers started to couple climate models
with catastrophe models to examine the ﬁnancial implications of climate change on in-
sured risk (Bresch et al., 2000; ABI, 2009; Wuest et al., 2011). The impact of climate change
on other insurance lines, such as index-based weather insurance, however remains to be
demonstrated. The aim of this paper is to ﬁll in this gap.
The literature examining the link between climate change and insurance focuses on
damage-basedformsofweatherinsurance, suchaspropertyandliabilityinsurance(Clemo,
2008; Ward et al., 2008). For damage-based insurance products, climate change implies
that new extreme events may occur that cause damages which exceed the extent of pre-
viously known damages, and in addition the frequency of weather-related losses is in-
creasing.8 These studies share the view that if weather related insurance losses continue
5Milly et al. (2008) deﬁnes stationarity as follows: “Stationarity is the idea that natural systems ﬂuctuate
within an unchanging envelope of variability. Stationarity implies that any variable has a time-invariant (or
a one year periodic) probability density function, whose properties can be estimated from the instrument
record.”
6According to Munich Re (2005), weather-related insurance costs have risen continuously (from 1950 to
2005).
7According to Mills (2005), insurers’ weather related loss models focus on catastrophic events, and loss-
frequency curves are predicted on extrapolating historical trends.
8Damage-based insurance products indemnify the insured for weather-related losses based on an in-
spection of the loss. The insured is thus guaranteed an indemniﬁcation according to the terms of the con-
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to rise, insurers will need to respond by increasing premiums, possibly restricting cover-
age and increasing deductibles for their damage-based weather insurance products. Less
attention has been devoted to climate change and parametric weather insurance, which is
the focus of this work.9
Index-based weather insurance is attractive from the perspective of insurers since no
uncertainty regarding the extent of payments (i.e. the losses for the insurer) exists. The
payoff structure deﬁnes the range of all possible payments. Climate change only affects
the uncertainty of incorrectly estimating the underlying weather (index) distribution, and
thus charging an inadequate premium. For the insured, however, this implies that losses
beyond the maximum payment are not insured. In contrast to damage-based insurance,
the risk reduction of parametric weather insurance depends on the weather distribution
(by affecting the premium) and on the pay-off structure, which determines the indemnity
for given realizations of the underlying weather index. With this in mind, we also aim
at shedding light on the consequences of using historical data for designing and pricing
parametric weather insurance products with respect to risk reduction.
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we determine the potential for weather
insurance in light of climate change. To do so, we evaluate the beneﬁts from hedging
weather risk given today’s climatic condition, and compare them to the beneﬁts from
hedging weather risks with adjusted insurance contracts in a warming and more variable
futureclimate. Anadjustedinsurancecontractexplicitlytakestheexpectedchangesinthe
mean and variability of both weather and crop yields into account. To design an adjusted
weather insurance contract, we use simulated (forward-looking) weather and yield data
representing a possible climate change scenario.
Second, we assess the effect on risk reduction from hedging weather risk in a chang-
ing climate with non-adjusted weather insurance contracts. Non-adjusted insurance con-
tracts are designed using historical (backward-looking) data.
We use a process-based crop simulation model to derive maize yields for today’s and
future climatic conditions. In particular, we use simulated maize yields for Schaffhausen
(SHA, latitude: 47.69, longitude: 8.62), Switzerland, that are derived with a process-based
crop simulation model, for the current climatic conditions (1981-2001), and for an IPCC
A2 emission scenario reﬂecting climatic conditions around 2050.
To derive weather insurance contracts, we simulate the pay-off structure using the
method developed by Kapphan (2011). Other methodologies for deriving weather in-
tract, and the insurance product thus delivers the desired risk reduction. Uncertainty about the extent and
frequency of losses is born by the insurer.
9Parametric insurance, such as index-based weather insurance, indemnify the insured based on the
realization of an exogenous, veriﬁable weather event.
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surance contracts exist, and could be used in general to address the research questions
outlined here. We use the model by Kapphan (2011) since the resulting contracts are de-
signed to yield optimal hedging effectiveness for the insured, or maximal proﬁts for the
insurer. The optimal contracts are derived by non-parametrically estimating yield distri-
butions conditional on weather, and maximizing the expected utility of the insured, or
by maximizing expected proﬁts for the insurer. Optimal weather insurance contracts are
characterized by a non-linear payoff structure (for the entire range of weather realiza-
tions).
Given the insurance contracts, we evaluate the beneﬁts from hedging weather risk
for today’s climate by using an insurance contract that has been simulated for today’s
conditions, and then compare the ﬁndings with the beneﬁts from hedging weather risk
in a future climate. To account for the increase in the weather and yield variability due
to climate change, we apply the insurance contract that has been derived using future
(projected) yield and weather data to future weather conditions. This comparison sheds
light on the potential of using weather insurance to hedge weather risks in a changing
climate under the assumption that insurers account for the non-stationarity of the un-
derlying weather and yield distributions. We ﬁnd that, with climate change, the beneﬁts
from hedging with adjusted contracts almost triple, and that expected proﬁts increase by
about 240% (depending on the contract).
To address our second research question, we use insurance contracts that are designed
for today’s climate and evaluate the risk reduction that can be achieved with them in a fu-
ture climate, i.e. we determine the risk reduction of non-adjusted insurance contracts. By
comparing the risk reduction of non-adjusted contracts with the beneﬁts from adjusted
insurance contracts, we quantify for the ﬁrst time the effect of not adapting insurance
contracts on risk reduction (expected proﬁts) for the insured (the insurer). Our results
indicate that insurers may either face substantial losses or generate proﬁts that are signif-
icantly smaller than proﬁts from offering adjusted insurance contracts. While our numer-
ical results are crop- and location-speciﬁc, our approach for evaluating the potential of
parametric weather insurance in a changing climate and for assessing the consequences
of offering non-adjusted contracts can be applied to any crop or location for which sufﬁ-
cient data (for calibrating a process-based crop model) exists.
A large strand of literature exists that examines the potential of index-based weather
insurance to hedge agricultural yield risk using historical weather and yield data (Barnett
and Vedeneov, 2004; Breustedt et al, 2008; Musshoff et al., 2009; Berg et al., 2009; Leblois
and Quirion, 2011). By using simulated weather and yield data, we follow Torriani et
al. (2007b), who ﬁrst used climate change data to analyze the beneﬁts from hedging
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drought risk in today’s and future climatic conditions. The idea to use “forward-looking
risk models that take climate change into account” is supported, for instance, by Mills
(2009). We extend the work by Torrini et al. (2007b) in two aspects. First, we use an
optimal weather insurance model to simulate the payoff structure and to determine the
hedging beneﬁts for the insured, as well as the expected proﬁts for the insurer, under
both climates. Second, and more importantly, we compare for the ﬁrst time the beneﬁts
from hedging future weather risk with an adjusted contract to the risk reduction from a
non-adjusted contract.
The remaining paper is structured as follows. In section 2, the theoretical approach
together with the insurance model and its numerical implementation is explained. The
data and climate change scenario used in this study are discussed in section 3. The design
of the underlying weather indices is outlined in section 4. In section 5, the results for
adjusted insurance contracts are presented, and section 6 shows the effect of using non-
adjusted contracts to hedge future weather risk. Section 7 concludes and provides an
outlook on further research.
2 Theoretical Approach
We use the model developed by Kapphan (2011) to numerically derive the pay-off struc-
ture of an index-based weather insurance with optimal hedging effectiveness for today’s
and future climatic conditions. For the numerical analysis, we consider ﬁve time periods
with different climatic conditions, indexed by c. In each climatic period, the insured is
faced with a stochastic revenue y ∈Y c ≡ [y
c,yc].10 We assume for the moment that c
only represents either today’s, t, or future climatic conditions, f, i.e. c = {t, f}.11 Then,
for a given climatic scenario c, yields in a given year i are represented by yc,i and zc,i rep-
resents the corresponding realization of a weather index. The inﬂuence of weather on
yields under given climatic conditions is captured through the conditional distribution
of yields with cdf Fc(y|z) with density fc(y|z). The distribution of the weather index,
z ∈Z c ≡ [zc,zc] is characterized by the cdf Gc(z) and density gc(z). Following Kapphan
(2011), theconditionaldistributionofyields Fc(y|z) andthecdfoftheweatherindex Gc(z)
are estimated non-parametrically using a Gaussian kernel function.
The insured is risk-averse and has preferences over consumption, θ, with θ = y +
10The insured generates revenue solely from selling the production output. An average price is used to
compute the revenue, and production costs are not considered in this framework.
11In the numerical section 6.2, we add 3 more climatic scenarios that represent the transition period, so
that in total 5 periods are analyzed.
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pc(z), which are characterized by constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), i.e. u(θ)=
θ1−σ
1−σ with σ > 0.12 To derive the optimal weather insurance pay-off structure pc(z) the
insured’s expected utility is maximized subject to the constraint that risk-neutral insurers
charge an actuarially fair premium for the contract.13 Formally, p∗
c(z) solves the expected







u(y + pc(z))dFc(y|z)dGc(z) (1)
subject to the constraint 
Zc
pc(z)dGc(z)=0. (2)
Constraint (2) implies that insurers make on average zero proﬁts, which is a widely used
method, known as the ”burn rate“ method, to price insurance contracts. The premium P
is then determined by the minimum of the net-payment function p∗
c(z).
Solving (1) subject to (2) with today’s conditional yield cdf, Ft(y|z), and the cdf of
today’s weather index, Gt(z), yields p∗
t(z). To obtain the optimal weather insurance con-
tract for future climatic conditions p∗
f(z), the optimization problem is solved analogously
with Ff(y|z), and Gf(z), which are obtained from simulated weather and yield data that
takes climate change into account. In reality, the insurer may add a mark-up on fair pre-
miums to cover additional costs associated with offering weather insurance. In order to
determine to which extent fair contracts can be loaded such that the insured still ﬁnds the
contract attractive, we also derive insurance contracts that maximize the insurer’s proﬁt.
Formally, for given climatic conditions, c, the proﬁt-maximizing insurance contract ˜ p∗
c(z)







subject to the constraint that the insured’s expected utility is equal to or greater than his











Maximum loading factors (in percent) are then determined by comparing the pre-
mium of the optimal (zero-proﬁt) contract P with the premium of the proﬁt-maximizing
12To numerically derive the optimal insurance contract, we use a moderate coefﬁcient of relative risk
aversion, i.e. σ = 2. For explorations of how σ affects the shape of the optimal weather insurance contract,
see Kapphan (2011).
13p(z) represent the net-insurance payments, i.e. the difference between the premium, P, and the insur-
ance indemnity.
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contract ˜ P (see Kapphan, 2011). By deriving both the optimal (zero-proﬁt) insurance con-
tract and the proﬁt-maximizing contract, the range of insurance contracts that could fea-
sibly be traded is fully characterized.
To quantify the risk reduction potential of an optimal insurance contract, we compute
the percentage increase of all income realizations in the situation without insurance that
makes farmers equally well-off (in expected utility terms) as in the situation with insur-

































Thus, δc(pc) measures the insured’s value of weather insurance for a given optimal in-
surance contract pc and given climatic conditions c. Furthermore, the statistical moments
of the income distribution with insurance are compared to the situation without insur-
ance to evaluate the beneﬁts from hedging. In addition, we compute the relative Value
at Risk (VaR) for the situation with insurance, which is the 5% Value at Risk (denoted
VaRI
c,5%) of the income distribution relative to the mean income, and compare it to the
relative VaRNI
c,5% of the situation without insurance. To obtain a complete assessment of
the hedging effectivenessof weather insurance, we eventually derive theconditional VaR,




For the insurer, we determine the expected proﬁt from offering a proﬁt-maximizing





By construction, the beneﬁts from hedging with a proﬁt-maximizing contract for the in-
sured, δc( ˜ pc), and the expected proﬁts for an optimal insurance contract, Πc(pc), are zero.
The beneﬁts from hedging with an optimal (zero-proﬁt) insurance contract for today’s cli-
matic conditions, δt(pt), are derived by evaluating the risk reduction in today’s climate,
δt, using an optimal contract pt(z). The beneﬁt from hedging weather risk in the future
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with an optimal contract, pf(z), is then given by δf(pf).
Comparing the future hedging effectiveness of an optimal contract, δf(pf), with to-
day’s hedging effectiveness of an optimal contract, δt(pt), allows us to quantify the bene-
ﬁts from using adjusted weather insurance contracts to cope with future weather risk (for
the insured). Similarly, by comparing today’s expected proﬁts, Πt( ˜ pt) with the expected
proﬁts from offering a proﬁt-maximizing contract in the future, Πf( ˜ pf), we quantify the
proﬁtability of offering weather insurance in light of climate change.
The risk reduction of a non-adjusted, optimal insurance contract is then given by
δf(pt), and Πf(pt) measures the expected proﬁts from offering non-adjusted, optimal
insurance contract with climate change.14 We also derive the expected proﬁts for the
insurer if he continues to offer today’s proﬁt-maximizing contract with climate change,
Πf( ˜ pt) , i.e. if the today’s proﬁt-maximizing contract is not adjusted over time. Similarly,
we evaluate the hedging effectiveness of today’s proﬁt-maximizing contract with climate
change, δf(pt).
By comparing future expected proﬁts from adjusted, proﬁt-maximizing contracts,
Πf( ˜ pf), with the expected proﬁts from offering non-adjusted, proﬁt-maximizing con-
tracts, Πf( ˜ pt), we evaluate the effect of offering non-adjusted insurance contracts on
expected proﬁts. Similarly, by comparing the risk reduction of an adjusted, optimal in-
surance contract, δf(pf), with the risk reduction from a non-adjusted, optimal contract,
δf(pt), the effect of hedging with non-adjusted weather insurance contracts for the in-
sured is quantiﬁed. Table 1 provides an overview of the notation and the different com-
parisions outlined.
3 Data and Climate Change Simulations
To derive maize (Zea mays L.) yield data for today’s climatic conditions and a climate
scenario, we follow Torriani et al. (2007a, 2007b) and use a process-based crop simula-
tion model in connection with a weather generator to simulate 1,000 yield realizations
for each climate scenario. Synthetic weather data needed as input are generated with the
stochastic weather generator LARS-WG (Semenov et al., 1998). Observed daily weather
data collected between 1981 and 2010 at Schaffhausen (latitude: 47.69, longitude: 8.62)
were used to condition LARS-WG, and baseline statistics were modiﬁed according to a
climate change scenario to yield daily weather series representing future climatic condi-
tions.
14If an optimal insurance contract is offered in climatic conditions that are different from the ones used
to design and price the contract, Πf(pt), is not necessarily equal to zero.
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Table 1: Notation for proﬁts and deltas from adjusted and non-adjusted contracts
Climate Contract Proﬁts Delta
today adjusted optimal pt 0 δt(pt)
proﬁt-maximizing ˜ pt Πc( ˜ pt) 0
future adjusted optimal pf 0 δf(pf)
proﬁt-maximizing ˜ pf Πc( ˜ pf) 0
non-adjusted optimal pt Πf(pt) δf(pt)
proﬁt-maximizing ˜ pt Πf( ˜ pt) δf( ˜ pt)
Note: Insurer’s proﬁt (Πc) and insured’s beneﬁt (δc) in a given climate scenario (c = t, f) depend on the
contract type (pc,o r˜ pc), and the climatic condition for which the contract was designed (for c,o rc − 1).
If contract pc or, respectively ˜ pc, is used for risk reduction in the climate scenario c, then δc(pc) represents
the risk reduction of an adjusted, optimal contract. δc( ˜ pc) represents the risk reduction from an adjusted,
proﬁt-maximizing contract. δc(pc−1) represents the risk reduction of an optimal, non-adjusted contract.
δc( ˜ pc−1) represents the risk reduction of a proﬁt-maximizing, non-adjusted contract.
As for the climate change scenario (2036-2065), we refer to the same data as used by
Lazzarotto et al. (2010) and Finger et al. (2011), that is regional projections for Europe
developed by Vidale et al. (2003) with the CHRM regional model in the framework of
the PRUDENCE project (Christensen et al., 2007) on the basis of a A2 emission scenario
(Nakicenovic et al., 2000). In practice, differences in monthly averages for the length of
wet and dry spells, total rainfall, daily minimum and maximum temperature, and daily
totals of solar radiation were ﬁrst inferred for the time span between 1961-1990 and 2071-
2100 originally addressed by PRUDENCE. The differences were then re-scaled in time
to yield a corresponding climate change signal for our baseline (1981-2010) and selected
future time window (2036-2065).
The synthetic daily weather data feeds into the process-based crop model CropSyst
(Stöckle et al., 2003) for maize. CropSyst is a deterministic crop physiological growth
model that simulates crop yields for given environmental and management conditions.
The calibration for maize is based on Torriani et al. (2007a, 2007b) and was adapted
for the newer CropSyst version 4.13.09. 15 Process-based crop simulation models are
widely used to study the response of plants to climate change, and to evaluate possible
adaption options (Bindi et al., 2010; Finger et al., 2011). Except for the sowing date, all
input parameters in CropSyst are kept constant. In today’s climate, sowing takes place
on calender day 130 (DOY). With climate change, the sowing data was shifted by 7 days
following Schmid (2006), and takes place on DOY = 123.
For the purpose of this study, three additional weather and yield scenarios were cre-
15Further details on the parametrization of CropSyst and of LARS-WG can be found in Torriani et al.
(2007a, 2007b), together with a comparison of simulated yields with historical yield observations.
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Table 2: Climatic interim scenarios
Climatic scenarios Today Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Future
1981-2001 moderate medium strong 2036-2065
Weights (t%/f%) 100/0 75/25 50/50 25/75 0/100
Contracts pt(zt) p75/25(z) p50/50(z) p25/75(z) pf(zf)
Note: Interim scenarios for both weather and yields are created by interpolation of today’s and future data.
t% is the percent of data used from today’s yield and weather distribution, and f% is the percent of data
drawn from the simulated weather and yield distribution for the 2036-2065 climate scenario.
ated using weighted random drawings from today’s and 2050’s weather series. Weights
of 75% and 25% (today and future), 50% and 50%, and 25% and 75% were assumed to cre-
ate interim scenarios.16 Table 2 summarizes the notation for the interim scenarios, and the
interpolation weights used for their creation. These interim scenarios cannot be related
to particular years between today and 2050, since the climate system may not change
linearly from today’s conditions to the projected climate around 2050.
Table 3 summarizes the statistical moments of the simulated maize data for the base-
line and the four climate scenarios. Average maize yields increase from 9,266 kilo per
hectare (kg/ha) under today’s climatic conditions to 8,190 kg/ha for the full 2036-2065
climate change scenario. At the same time, the standard deviation (std) increases from
1,456.5 to 2,105.7 kg/ha, with a corresponding increase in the coefﬁcient of variation
(CV) from 0.157 to 0.257. Overall, we observe that mean yields decrease and maize pro-
duction is becoming more risky. This tendencies can also be inferred from Figure 1. This
can also be inferred from Figure 1 (left), which shows the boxplots for the 5 yield distri-
butions, and the change in the revenues from maize production (right).17 Hence, without
adaptation, maize production is not only becoming less proﬁtable, but also more risky
over time.
Table 3: Descriptive analysis of simulated maize yields
Climatic Today Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Future
scenario 1981-2001 moderate medium strong 2036-2065
mean (kg/ha) 9266 9038 8762 8449 8190
std (kg/ha) 1456.5 1681.7 1885.7 2022.2 2105.7
CV 0.157 0.186 0.215 0.239 0.257
skewness -0.6881 -0.5992 -0.2615 -0.0042 0.1840
Note: Evolution of maize yield statistics for SHA over time
16Thus, c reﬂects 5 possible climate scenarios with c = {t,75/25,50/50,25/75, f}.
17Revenues from maize production are derived by multiplying crop yields with the average price for
maize from 2006 to 2009, which was 41.00 CHF/100kg (SBV, 2010). Production costs are not considered.
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Figure 1: Evolution of the maize yield and revenue distribution over time
4 Weather Index Design
The core assumption underlying weather insurance is that there exists a co-variate rela-
tionship between crop yields and the underlying weather index. The design of an index-
based weather insurance product thus involves identifying a weather index that predicts
crop yields well. By creating weather indices that possess a high correlation with crop
yields, basis risk is minimized.18 Since plant development is affected throughout the
growing phase by various weather events, multi-peril weather indices tend to predict
crop yields better than single weather events (such as cumulated precipitation or mean
temperature). We therefore use a phenology driven approach developed by Kapphan
(2011) to create weather indices that provide risk protection for a number of weather
events occurring throughout the growing period.
To account for the fact that with climate change phenology phases occur earlier in
the season, weather variables are derived at each phenology phase for both climatic sce-
narios (c, f). Phenology stages are estimated based on growing degree days (GDDs),
the sowing date, and the number of GDDs needed to complete each phenology phase.
For maize, 4 phenology phases are distinguished: emergence, vegetative period, grain
ﬁlling, and maturity. Table 4 shows the GDD levels that correspond to each phenology
phase and the corresponding calender dates for today’s and future climatic conditions. In
particular, we use the following variables: averages of maximum and minimum tempera-
tures (m.tmin, and m.tmax), mean precipitation (m.precip), the moisture availability to the
18Basis risk is deﬁned as the risk that the payoffs for a given insurance contract do not correspond to the
yield shortfall.
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plant (P.ETo), and the potential evapotranspiration (RDI), which were set in accordance
with GDD thresholds used in CropSyst.19 Next, multivariate regressions are performed
to identify weather events that explain a large fraction of the maize yield variability in
both climates. The estimated coefﬁcients are then used to construct weather indices. The
resulting weather indices thus represent predicted yields, and are measured in kg/ha.
Table 4: Timing of phenology phases and corresponding GDDs
Phenology Emergence Vegetative Grain Maturity
Phases Period Filling
GDD level 40 700 840 1250
Today (DOY) 133-142 195-213 208-227 243-275
avg. DOY 136 204 217 257
Future (DOY) 126-133 186-200 199-212 230-244
avg. DOY 128 192 204 236
Note: Crop: maize, location: SHA, Sowing date for today’s climatic conditions: DOY=130, Sowing data for
future conditions: DOY=123.
We use this approach to construct multi-peril weather indices for today’s and future
climatic conditions using the respective weights, as shown in Table 15 in the Appendix.
For the purpose of this study, we select 4 weather indices – single as well as multi-peril
indices – that offer risk protection for different weather phenomena and vary in their
goodness of ﬁt. Since precipitation is found to be a major driver of maize growth in
Schaffhausen, all indices use precipitation as an input.20 Figure 2 shows the densities of
Index 2 and 4 for today’s and future climatic conditions. We observe a leftward shift of
all index densities, which is caused by a decrease in precipitation in our climate scenario.
Further, we ﬁnd that with climate change the effect of weather on maize yields increases.
For example, for today’s weather condition, Index 2 explains 50.3% of maize yield varia-
tions, while with climate change 68.3% are explained. For Index 3, the Spearman rank
correlation coefﬁcient increases from 46.3% to 67.8% with climate change. Overall, a
larger fraction of maize yields is explained by weather, which implies that the potential
for hedging yield risk with weather-based insurance products improves. Table 5 sum-
marizes the Spearman correlation coefﬁcients and adjusted R-Square for the 4 weather
indices for both climate scenarios.
We derive interim scenarios for the weather indices (predicted yields) by interpolating
the distributions gt(z) and gf(z) in the same manner as for crop yields (see section 3). As
19For more information about the weather variables, see Kapphan (2011).
20Precipitation enters either directly as an average (as in Index 2), or indirectly via the computation of
potential evapotranspiration (as in Index 3), or for deriving the moisture deﬁcit measure (as in Index 4).
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with crop yields, we observe over time a decrease in mean index values, and a widening
of the standard deviation over time for all indices.21
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of weather indices
in % Index 1 Index 2 Index 3 Index 4
Today Corr 60.8 70.9 68.1 78.9
adj.R2 37.0 50.3 46.3 62.2
Future Corr 62.6 82.6 82.3 86.3
adj.R2 39.2 68.3 67.8 74.5
Note: Today’s weather indices are selected based on the Spearman rank correlation coefﬁcient (Corr) and
the adjusted R-Square (adj.R2) from the weather-yield regression for today’s conditions. Future weather
indices are constructed using the same weather variables, measured during future phenology phases, and
using the coefﬁcients from future weather-yield regressions as weights.
Figure 2: Densities of weather Index 2 and 4 for today’s (green) and future (red) cli-
matic conditions. Estimates of the mean and standard deviation at each realization of
the weather index are shown as boxplots.
21In the Appendix, Table 16 reports the statistical moments over time for all indices. Thus, we ﬁnd that
neither the maize yield data, nor the data of the underlying (predicted) weather indices is stationary over
time.
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5 Results: Adjusted Weather Insurance Contracts
5.1 Comparison of Optimal Contracts Today and with Climate Change
We start by comparing the optimal adjusted weather insurance contract for today’s con-
ditions, pt, with the optimal adjusted contract for future conditions, pf. The shape of the
optimal contracts, pt and pf, reﬂects the changes in the riskiness of the respective condi-
tional yield distributions, as explained in Kapphan (2011), and is non-linear for the entire
range of weather realizations. All optimal contracts pay out for low values of the weather
index, and have negative net-payments (corresponding to a premium payment) for very
high values of the index. At the point where the net-payment is equal to zero, the insured
fully recovers the premium. The minimum of the pay-off function deﬁnes the premium.22
Figure 3 shows the optimal weather insurance contract for Index 2 for today’s and
future climatic conditions.23 We obtain estimates of the standard deviation for pc(z) (at
each realization of z) by 10 times randomly drawing 900 observations with replacement
from the data, and solving (1) subject to (2) as described in section 2.24 The standard
deviation of pt for moderate z is on average equal to 68.7 CHF/ha, and with climate
change, std(pf) is on average equal to 67.9 CHF/ha. The standard deviation of pt and
pf increases only for very extreme realizations of the weather index, i.e. std(pt)=119.2
CHF/ha, and respectively, std(pf)=150.3 CHF/ha, i.e. for very high, and rare weather
events. Our method for simulating optimal weather insurance contracts thus produces
robust results.
As pointed out in section 4, the density of the weather index, gc(z), shifts to the left
with climate change (see Figure 2), which is due to a decrease in precipitation during the
growing season. In addition, the weather density widens with climate change (i.e. from
c = t to c = f), which is due to an increase in the number of drought-like weather events.
The optimal future contract accounts for these new weather conditions in two ways: i)
the payoff function covers these additional weather extremes, and ii) the shape of the
payoff function changes (for each realizations of the index). In particular, we ﬁnd that the
future optimal payoff function, pf, is deﬁned over a wider range of index realizations that
covers these additional drought-like conditions. Under today’s climatic conditions, pt for
22The gross-payoff function can be obtained by adding the premium to each net-payment. The recovery
point of the net payoff function thus represents the trigger level of a stylized (linear) weather derivative.
Analogously, the maximum payment of the optimal gross-payoff function can be interpreted as the cap of
a stylized weather derivative contract.
23 In the Appendix, Figure 10 shows the optimal weather insurance contracts for all indices for today’s
and future climatic conditions. The results described here for Index 2 are similar for the other indices.
24This procedure is also used to obtain estimates for the standard deviation of the risk reduction, as
measured by δc, and the expected proﬁts, as measured by Πc, discussed in sections 5.2 to 5.3.
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Figure 3: Optimal contracts (dashed line) for Index 2 with standard deviation (solid lines)
given today’s (green) and future (red) climatic conditions.
Index 2 is deﬁned for values of z between 2,749 CHF/ha and 5,707 CHF/ha. With climate
change, the smallest value of z is 1,791 CHF/ha and the maximum is 5,941 CHF/ha.
Whiletherangeofweathereventscoveredincreases, themagnitudeofeachnet-payoff
decreases with climate change for the entire range of the weather index. The maximum
net-payment decreases from 1,399 CHF for today’s contract to 1.133 CHF for an adjusted
optimal contract (given Index 2). Note that the probability of having to pay the full pre-
mium is in both climate scenarios very small, as can be seen from Figure 4, which shows
today’s optimal contract and the future optimal contract together with the densities of the
respective weather indices.25 At the same time, the premiums for optimal adjusted con-
tracts more than double (depending on the index). For instance, in today’s conditions an
optimal insurance contract costs 593.0 CHF, and with climate change, an adjusted optimal
contract costs 1,645 CHF (based on Index 2).
We also ﬁnd that while the recovery point of adjusted future contracts shifts to the
left, the recovery probability increases.26 Given today’s climate, the insured recovers the
premium almost every second year (49.5 − 51.5%), and with climate change the recov-
ery probability increases to 51.9 − 57.7% (depending on the index). Table 6 provides an
overview of the premiums, maximum payments, and the recovery probabilities for to-
day’s and future climatic conditions. For today’s climate, high net-payments (pt ≥ 500
CHF) only occur with low probabilities (11.5 − 16.7%), and the likelihood of weather
25In the Appendix, Figure 11 to 13 show the optimal and proﬁt-maximizing insurance contracts for Index
1, 3, and 4 together with the density of their underlying weather indices for today’s and future climatic
conditions.
26The recovery probability is the probability of realizing index values equal or smaller than the the recov-
ery point.
IED Working Paper 17 165 Results: Adjusted Weather Insurance Contracts
Figure 4: Optimal (solid line) and proﬁt-maximizing (dashed line) insurance contracts for
Index 2 with density, for today’s (green) and future (red) climatic conditions.
events that cause net-payments less than −500 CHF (pt ≤− 500) is between 2.6% and
10.2% (depending on the index). With climate change, the probability of the contract pay-
ing more than 500 CHF almost doubles (for Index 2 and 3), and ranges from 15.6− 27.2%
(depending on the index). This explains why we observe an increase in the premiums and
in their likelihoods. For all indices, the probability of moderate net-payments between
500 CHF and 0 CHF decreases, together with the probability of having to pay between
0 and −500 CHF. Figure 4 shows in addition the adjusted, proﬁt-maximizing insurance
contracts. While the proﬁt-maximizing contracts, ˜ pt and ˜ pf, possess the same shape as
their actuarially fair counterparts, pt and pf, they pay out less at each realization of z. The
difference in net-payments (˜ pc − pc) is captured by the insurer. With climate change, the
difference in net-payments increases, and hence proﬁts increase (see section 5.2).
Future optimal contracts thus offer an increased protection against extreme events (i.e.
higher probability of high net-payments with pf ≥ 500), while they provide slightly re-
duced moderate payments (between 500 and −500 CHF) for moderate deviations from
the mean of the weather index. The increased coverage against the more frequent occur-
rence of extreme events is partially ﬁnanced by decreasing net-payments over the entire
range of all weather realizations and by substantially increasing the premiums in those
rare years with excellent weather conditions.
5.2 Hedging Effectiveness of Optimal Adjusted Contracts
We evaluate the risk reduction from hedging weather risk by deriving δc for all climatic
scenarios as described in section 2, for a moderate risk aversion level (σ = 2). Buying
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Table 6: Contract parameters of optimal, adjusted contracts
Net-Payment Premium max. recovery 500 to 0 to -500 to premium
payout probab. max.payout 500 0 to -500
Index 1 today 640.3 971.8 51.2% 11.5% 39.2% 42.1% 7.2%
future 1.634 776.2 51.9% 15.6% 36.6% 37.4% 10.7%
Index 2 today 593.0 1.399 49.6% 12.8% 36.7% 40.3% 10.2%
future 1.645 1.133 57.7% 24.2% 33.6% 23.1% 19.1%
Index 3 today 624.7 1.579 51.5% 13.4% 38.1% 45.9% 2.6%
future 1.640 1.149 55.6% 26.6% 29.1% 23.8% 20.5%
Index 4 today 602.9 1.650 49.5% 16.7% 32.9% 41.8% 8.6%
future 1.675 1.141 55.2% 27.2% 28.1% 23.6% 21.1%
Note: Payments and maximum payout are measured in CHF/ha.
optimal weather insurance today is equivalent to increasing the income of the insured in
all states of the world by 1.37 − 2.09% (depending on the index). We observe that with
climate change, δc from hedging with adjusted optimal contracts increases continually
over time, and more than doubles up to the year 2050. When buying an adjusted optimal
contract in the future, the insured’s income in the situation without insurance would need
to be increased by 3.00 − 5.42% (depending on the index) to make the insured as well off
(in expected utility terms) as in the situation with insurance.
Thus, with climate change, the insured attributes a higher value of hedging weather
risk with an optimal adjusted contract. The standard deviation for these estimates does
not increase signiﬁcantly over time. We have restricted the analysis to a moderate level
of risk aversion. The hedging beneﬁts for a more risk-averse individual (σ > 2) under
both today’s and future climate conditions are even more substantial.27 Table 7 shows
the estimates of δc with the corresponding standard deviation for all indices and climatic
scenarios, and in Figure 5, we show boxplots of δc over time for all indices.
We also compare the income distribution without insurance to the situation where
the farmer uses an optimal adjusted contract, pc, and, respectively, a proﬁt-maximizing
contract, ˜ pc, to hedge his weather risk in today’s and future climatic conditions.Given
today’s weather conditions, the mean income without insurance is 3,696 CHF/ha with
a standard deviation of 186.3 CHF/ha. The optimal insurance contract, pt, preserves
the mean income, but greatly reduces the standard deviation to 106.6 − 139.9 CHF/ha
(depending on the index). The income distribution with a proﬁt-maximizing contract,
˜ pt, possess the same standard deviations as with pt, but the average income is reduced
27Kapphan (2011) shows for today’s climatic conditions using the same weather indices and optimal
contracts that with a coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion of σ ∈ [5,7], δt is between 4.2% and 10.7%.
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Table 7: δ (in %) for optimal adjusted contracts over time
Index 1 Index 2 Index 3 Index 4
today 1.37 1.83 1.82 2.09
(std) (0.15) (0.18) (0.23) (0.24)
moderate 2.23 3.04 2.98 3.31
(std) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.16)
medium 2.78 3.90 3.86 4.20
(std) (0.00) (0.12) (0.11) (0.15)
strong 3.01 4.57 4.54 4.92
(std) (0.17) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
future 3.00 4.99 4.98 5.42
(std) (0.20) (0.25) (0.28) (0.26)
Figure 5: Evolution of δ (in %) over time for all optimal adjusted contracts.
by 49 − 75 CHF/ha (depending on the index). With climate change, the mean income
without insurance decreases by more than 10% (to 3,294 CHF/ha), while the standard
deviation increases by 49.9% (to 279.4 CHF/ha). An adjusted optimal insurance contract,
pf, such as the one based on Index 4, can reduce the future standard deviation by factor
2 (to 130,6 CHF/ha). The proﬁt-maximizing adjusted contract, ˜ pf, achieves the same risk
reduction, but lowers the average future income (by 88−163 CHF/ha, depending on the
index) compared to the future un-hedged situation. Table 8 summarizes the statistical
properties (mean, standard deviation, skewness) of the income distributions with and
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withoutinsurancefortoday’sandfutureclimaticconditions.28 Figure6showstheincome
distributions with insurance, for both the optimal and proﬁt-maximizing contract, and for
the scenario without hedging for both climate scenarios.29
Table 8: Income without and with insurance
optimal no insurance Index 1 Index 2 Index 3 Index 4
today mean 3.696 3.696 3.696 3.696 3.696
std 186.3 139.9 116.0 120.0 106.6
skw -0.222 -0.192 -0.075 -0.030 -0.042
future mean 3.294 3.294 3.294 3.294 3.294
std 279.4 208.2 147.2 146.3 130.6
skw 0.061 0.149 -0.024 -0.008 0.025
proﬁt no insurance Index 2 Index 2 Index 3 Index 4
today mean 3.696 3.647 3.627 3.630 3.621
std 186.3 139.9 116.0 120.1 106.6
skw -0.222 -0.191 -0.074 -0.030 -0.042
future mean 3.294 3.206 3.145 3.145 3.131
std 279.4 208.4 147.4 146.5 131.3
skw 0.061 0.149 -0.027 -0.010 0.021
Note: Descriptive statistics of income without and with optimal and proﬁt-maximizing insurance contracts
for all indices and today’s and future climatic conditions. Units: CHF/ha.
When hedging weather risk today and in the future with climate change, the insured
faces less risk of realizing very low incomes, and lower probabilities of realizing very high
incomes, i.e. the insurance contracts compresses the income distribution. An optimal
weather insurance contract thus redistributes incomes over time from good harvest years
to bad years.
The relative Value at Risk (VaRα) is another preference-free risk measure, and is de-
ﬁned as follows:
rel.VaRα% =
(¯ y − yα%)
¯ y
, (8)
where ¯ y represents the mean income and yα% the income at the α% quantile. We evaluate
the effect of weather insurance by comparing the relative VaR of the income distribution
without insurance (VaRNI
α%) with the relative VaR of the income distribution with insur-
ance (VaRI
α%) and thus measure the reduction in the likelihood of income loss for the
28In Table 17 in the Appendix, we report changes in the statistical moments of the income distributions
with and without insurance over time for Index 3 and Figure 14 shows the boxplots of the income distribu-
tion with and without insurance for Index 3.
29A comparison of the income distributions with and without insurance for both climate scenarios and
all indices can be found in Figure 15 in the Appendix.
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Figure 6: Income distributions with optimal (solid line) and proﬁt-maximizing (dashed
line) insurance based on Index 2 and without insurance (pointed line) for today’s (green)
and future (red) climatic conditions.
extreme weather events that occur with a probability α%. In Table 9, we report VaRNI
α%
and VaRI
α% for all climatic scenarios and indices, for α = 5%.
For today’s climatic conditions, there is a 5% probability that the insured realizes
an income (loss) that is 31.1% lower than the average income without insurance, i.e.
VaRNI
t,5% = 31.1%. With climate change, the income loss increases gradually to 38.7%
(with respect to ¯ y) with a 5% likelihood. An optimal insurance contracts reduce the in-
come loss today to 16.7 − 22.8% (depending on the index). With a proﬁt-maximizing
contract, today’s income loss is also reduced, but VaRI
t,5%( ˜ pt) is on average 2 percentage
points higher, compared to VaRI
t,5%(pt). Under future climatic conditions, hedging with
an optimal adjusted contract reduces the income loss to 29.1 − 21.1% compared to the
future average income (¯ yf).
We ﬁnally derive the average magnitude of income loss given that an extreme weather
eventoccurs(forthe α = 5%-level). Theexpectedshortfall(ES)istheprobabilityweighted
average of the worst α = 5% incomes and thus represents the expectation of income in
the case that a tail event occurs.30 We derive the ES for the income scenarios with ad-
justed insurance contracts (ESI
c,5%) and for the situation without insurance (ESNI
c,5%) for
today’s and future climatic conditions.31 Table 10 shows the 5%-VaR and the expected
shortfall for today’s and future climatic conditions. Without insurance, the ESNI
t,5% is equal
30The ES is a measure of tail-risk and is also referred to as the conditional tail expectation, expected tail
loss, worst conditional expectation, or tail conditional VaR.
31In contrast to the literature (Dowd and Blake, 2006), where the ESis derived for the loss distribution, we
derive the ES for the income distributions with and without insurance, and compare the expected shortfall
from hedging, ESI
c,5%, to the situation without hedging, ESNI
c,5%.
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Table 9: Relative 5%-Value at Risk for adjusted contracts
VaRNI
5% VaRI
5% Index 1 Index 2 Index 3 Index 4
today 31.1 optimal 22.8 18.8 18.5 16.7
0.65 std 0.93 1.09 1.05 1.03
- proﬁt 24.2 20.6 20.3 18.7
- std 0.95 1.10 1.12 0.96
moderate 35.5 optimal 24.5 20.1 19.9 18.0
1.04 std 0.44 0.43 0.38 0.41
- proﬁt 27.3 25.3 25.1 19.2
- std 0.65 1.02 0.86 0.65
medium 38.1 optimal 25.9 20.8 20.4 18.7
0.62 std 0.70 0.77 0.65 0.63
- proﬁt 26.6 21.4 21.0 19.3
- std 0.61 0.87 0.77 0.67
strong 39.1 optimal 27.7 22.2 21.7 20.0
0.67 std 0.84 0.75 0.53 0.62
- proﬁt 27.6 22.3 22.0 20.2
- std 0.75 0.72 0.51 0.59
future 38.7 optimal 29.1 22.9 22.7 21.2
1.13 std 0.60 0.77 0.73 0.53
- proﬁt 29.0 23.5 23.3 21.4
- std 0.78 0.62 1.02 0.68
Note: VaRI
5% (in %) of the income distribution for adjusted optimal and proﬁt-maximizing insurance con-
tracts, and VaRNI
5% (in 5%) for the income situation without insurance are derived for all climatic scenarios.
to 3,292 CHF/ha for today’s conditions. With optimal adjusted insurance, the expected
income ESI
t,5% given that the lower 5%-extreme weather events happen is between 3,390
and 3,475 CHF/ha, i.e. optimal adjusted insurance increases the expected income given
an extreme event by 100 to 180 CHF/ha. With climate change, the expected unhedged
income is 2,727 CHF/ha for the situation with the 5%-extreme event. With an adjusted
contract, the expected income in that 5%-event is 2,886 to 3,023 CHF/ha.
In conclusion, both types of adjusted insurance contracts reduce the risk of realiz-
ing low incomes. When comparing the hedging effectiveness of our contracts over time,
we ﬁnd that the beneﬁts from using weather insurance increases signiﬁcantly with cli-
mate change, which is due to the fact that with climate change weather exerts a stronger
inﬂuence on crop yields. That is, with climate change, the preconditions for hedging
yield risk with an index-based weather insurance product improves. We have shown that
these ﬁndings are robust across indices and independent from the risk measure used. If a
mark-up is added to the fair premium, the insured gets the same risk reduction beneﬁts
(as with a zero-proﬁt contract) but at the cost of a reduced (average) income. By evaluat-
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Table 10: 5%-VaR and expected shortfall (ES) for adjusted contracts
no. ins. contract Index 1 Index 2 Index 3 Index 4
today 3,377 optimal VaR I
t,5% 3,415 3,502 3,503 3,518
- proﬁt 3,402 3,434 3,437 3,443
3,292 optimal EXI
t,5% 3,390 3,453 3,447 3,475
- proﬁt 3,341 3,385 3,381 3,399
future 2,839 optimal VaR I
f,5% 2,954 3,052 3,052 3,081
- proﬁt 2,865 2,903 2,905 2,915
2,727 optimal EXI
f,5% 2,886 2,981 2,990 3,023
- proﬁt 2,797 2,832 2,840 2,858
Note: 5%-VaR and Expected Shortfall (ES) at the 5% level of the income distribution with (ESI
c,5%) and
without insurance (ESNI
c,5%) are shown for today’s and future climatic conditions and for all indices. Unit:
CHF/ha.
ing the hedging beneﬁts of a proﬁt-maximizing contract, we have considered the extreme
case where the insurer captures the entire gain from hedging, so that the insured is (in ex-
pected utility terms) indifferent to the un-hedged situation. In practice, these gains can be
shared between theinsurer andthe insured. For allrisk measures, we observethat thereis
a variation of hedging beneﬁts across contracts. In general, the better the goodness-of-ﬁt
of the underlying index with crop yields, the better the risk reduction.
5.3 Expected Proﬁts from Proﬁt-Maximizing Adjusted Contracts
We derive the expected proﬁts, Πc, that an insurer can expect to earn from offering a
proﬁt-maximizing insurance contract by solving (7) for all climatic conditions given ˜ pc
and gc(z).32 Table 11 shows the expected proﬁts for all indices over time together with the
estimated standard deviation, for σ = 2. For today’s climatic conditions, the insurer can
expect to earn between 41.6 to 67.2 CHF/ha of insured maize. We ﬁnd that with climate
change, expected proﬁts increase gradually over time and reach substantial values. For
instance, expected proﬁts for Index 1 double, and they increase by 240% for the other
three indices by the year 2050. In Figure 7, we present boxplots of expected proﬁts over
time for all indices.
We observe that the variation in expected proﬁts across indices as well as the variation
of δc across indices (as seen in section 5.2), is related to the goodness-of-ﬁt of the underly-
ing weather indices with maize yields (see section 4, Table 5). The higher the correlation
of the weather index with yields, the better the hedging effectiveness (as measured by δ)
32Note that the expected proﬁts from an optimal adjusted insurance contract are zero by construction.
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Table 11: Proﬁts (Π) from proﬁt-maximizing adjusted contracts over time
Index 1 Index 2 Index 3 Index 4
today 41.61 61.29 58.78 67.29
(std) (4.24) (5.84) (4.96) (6.42)
moderate 74.80 103.08 100.94 112.56
(std) (6.10) (5.99) (6.01) (5.30)
medium 89.51 126.93 125.62 137.32
(std) (2.94) (3.85) (3.58) (4.64)
strong 92.20 142.2 141.48 153.84
(std) (5.32) (3.23) (3.51) (3.43)
future 88.28 149.56 149.20 163.30
(std) (5.92) (7.42) (8.30) (8.00)
Note: Proﬁts are measured in CHF/ha.
and the higher are expected proﬁts (as measured by Π).
Figure 7: Evolution of proﬁts (in CHF/ha) over time for all proﬁt-maximizing adjusted
contracts.
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6 Results: Non-Adjusted Weather Insurance Contracts
6.1 Comparison of Adjusted and Non-Adjusted Contracts
We now examine the risk reduction from hedging future weather risk with non-adjusted
insurance contracts. For that purpose, we ﬁrst analyze the payout probabilities of non-
adjusted contracts, which were initially priced and designed for today’s weather con-
ditions, but are used under future climatic conditions. We then compare the payout-
probabilities of non-adjusted contracts to the payout characteristics of adjusted contracts
in future climatic conditions (see Table 12).
We ﬁnd that the non-adjusted contracts based on Index 1 and 4 have higher recovery
probabilities than the corresponding adjusted contracts. For instance, the insured recov-
ers the premium of an adjusted contract (based on Index 4) with a probability of 55.2%,
while the premium is recovered with a probability of 84.6% with the non-adjusted con-
tract. The increase in the recovery probability of non-adjusted contracts 1 and 4 is a result
of an increase in the occurrence of weather events that trigger very high net-payments.
For Index 4, the probability of net-payments above 500 CHF increases from 27.2% (given
an adjusted contract) to 55.2% with the non-adjusted contract.
For Indices 2 and 3, we ﬁnd that the likelihood of fully recovering the premium de-
creases. The adjusted contract based on Index 2 triggers very high net-payments (pf(z) >
500 CHF) with 24.2%, while the non-adjusted contract delivers high net-payments only
with a probability of 10.0%. This implies that the non-adjusted contracts based on Index
2 and 3 do not provide sufﬁciently high net-payments when needed.
The non-adjusted contracts based on Index 1 and 4, provide however very high net-
payments even in situations where smaller payments would have been sufﬁcient to cover
the losses. For Index 1 and 4, the non-adjusted contracts trigger net-payments of less
than −500 CHF (pf(z) ≤− 500) less often than the corresponding adjusted contracts.
For instance, the probability of net-payments that are less than −500 CHF is 2.2% with
the non-adjusted contract, compared to 21.1% with the adjusted contract. With future
weather conditions, an actuarial fair contract implies that the insured can expect to pay
the full premium approximately every 5th year (given that excellent weather conditions
have a return period of 21.1%).
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With non-adjusted contracts (based on Index 4), this event happens only every 50th
years. This already suggests that the non-adjusted contract will no longer be proﬁtable to
the insurer (see section 6.2).
Comparing the payout probabilities of non-adjusted contracts with those from ad-
justed contracts provides a ﬁrst impression of the weather events that are being hedged
by non-adjusted contracts. Non-adjusted contracts 1 and 4 provide positive net-payments
with a higher probability, while the probabilities of negative net-payments decreases
(compared to the corresponding adjusted contract). For contracts 2 and 3, it is less clear
if the insured is better or worse off with the non-adjusted contracts. For that purpose,
we turn to the evaluation of the hedging effectiveness of non-adjusted contracts. Risk
measures are better suited to discriminate between different insurance contracts. For the
remaining analysis, δc is our preferred measure for comparing the risk reduction of ad-
justed with non-adjusted insurance contracts.33
6.2 Hedging Effectiveness and Expected Proﬁts of Non-Adjusted Con-
tracts
Todeterminethehedgingeffectivenessofnon-adjustedcontracts, wederive δc fromhedg-
ing with the optimal and proﬁt-maximizing non-adjusted contracts, and compare it with
the hedging effectiveness of the adjusted contract. For a more realistic comparison, we
take into account that insurers are updating the design (and pricing) of their insurance
products over long time periods, such as the one considered here, i.e. between 1990 and
2050. In particular, we assume that insurers adapt their weather insurance products at the
end of each climatic scenario, i.e. they use the new weather and yield data that is becom-
ing available to update their contracts for the coming scenario. For that purpose, we use
the interim scenarios and simulate ﬁrst the adjusted insurance contracts (pc and ˜ pc) for
all scenarios c ∈{ t,75/25,50/50,25/75, f}. We derive the income distributions in each
climatic scenario c from hedging with the non-adjusted (optimal and proﬁt-maximizing)
contracts from the previous period c − 1. We then determine δc for hedging weather risk
in c with non-adjusted optimal insurance products, i.e δc(pc−1(z)), and for hedging with
a non-adjusted proﬁt-maximizing contract, i.e. δc( ˜ pc−1(z)).34 Table 13 summarizes the
results, and Figure 8 shows the evolution of δc for adjusted and non-adjusted contracts
over time for all indices. We ﬁnd that δc(pc−1(z)) can be bigger or smaller than δc(pc(z)).
33In section 5.2, we showed that it produces the same qualitative results as the other preference-free risk
measures, and that it is better suited for comparing the hedging effectiveness across climatic scenarios as it
considerers the effect of insurance on the entire income distribution.
34Note that δc( ˜ pc−1) is in contrast to δc( ˜ pc) not necessarily equal to zero.
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In contrast to hedging with adjusted contracts, we observe that δc(pc−1(z)) takes on neg-
ative values, i.e. the expected utility of the insured is reduced through insurance. As a
result, such non-adjusted contracts would not be purchased.
Table 13: δ (in%) for adjusted and non-adjusted insurance contracts
Index 1 Index 2 Index 3 Index 4
today adjusted optimal 1.37 1.83 1.82 2.09
(std) (0.15) (0.18) (0.23) (0.24)
moderate adjusted optimal 2.23 3.04 2.98 3.31
(std) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.16)
non-adjusted optimal -2.42 -6.98 -5.34 12.93
(std) 1.10 1.37 1.38 2.67
proﬁt -3.82 -8.95 -7.23 10.81
(std) 1.10 1.38 1.38 2.67
medium adjusted optimal 2.78 3.90 3.86 4.20
(std) 0.00 0.12 0.11 0.15
non-adjusted optimal 9.28 6.23 6.56 5.88
(std) 1.60 1.39 1.67 2.04
proﬁt 7.23 3.40 3.76 2.76
(std) 1.60 1.38 1.67 2.04
strong adjusted optimal 3.01 4.57 4.54 4.92
(std) 0.17 0.10 0.11 0.11
non-adjusted optimal 6.31 8.87 8.74 9.39
(std) 1.16 0.53 1.19 1.60
proﬁt 3.37 6.07 4.87 5.21
(std) 1.17 0.52 1.19 1.58
future adjusted optimal 3.00 4.99 4.98 5.42
(std) 0.20 0.25 0.28 0.26
non-adjusted optimal 5.36 8.12 8.14 10.04
(std) 1.82 0.97 3.04 1.93
proﬁt 2.24 3.39 3.43 4.92
(std) 1.82 0.95 3.02 1.92
Note: δ is the percentage increase of all income realizations without insurance compared to the situation
with insurance. Deltas (δc(z)) from non-adjusted contracts in a given climate scenario (c) are derived by
applying the optimal (pc−1(z)) or the proﬁt-maximizing (˜ pc−1(z)) insurance contract from the previous
climatic scenario (c − 1) to the current climate scenario. Deltas from adjusted contracts are derived by
applying the optimal insurance contract (pc(z)) to the conditions for which it is derived, namely to c.
Furthermore, wedeterminetheexpectedproﬁtsforinsurersfromofferingnon-adjusted
weather insurance contracts. For that purpose, we derive the expected proﬁts, Πc, in each
climatic scenario from offering the non-adjusted, optimal (pc−1(z)) and non-adjusted,
proﬁt-maximizing contract (˜ pc−1(z)). We then compare Πc(pc−1(z)) and, respectively,
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Πc( ˜ pc−1(z)) with the expected proﬁts from the adjusted proﬁt-maximizing contract,
Πc( ˜ pc(z)). Table 14 reports the proﬁts from non-adjusted contracts together with the prof-
its from adjusted contracts (from section 5.3, Table 11), and Figure 9 shows the evolution
of proﬁts from adjusted and non-adjusted contracts over time for all indices. We ﬁnd that
some non-adjusted contracts create losses for the insurer, and as a result would not be
offered. By evaluating the risk reduction (for the insured) from non-adjusted contracts,
and simultaneously assessing the proﬁtability (for the insurer), we capture over time the
effect of using backward looking data to design and price weather insurance products in
light of climate change.
Figure 8: Delta (in %) for adjusted (blue) and non-adjusted optimal (pink, solid line)
and non-adjusted proﬁt-maximizing contracts (pink, dashed line) are shown over time
for all indices. The non-adjusted δc from hedging with an optimal contract δc(pc−1(z))
is derived by determining the risk reduction in climatic scneario c from hedging with
an optimal contract (pc−1(z)) from the previous period c − 1. Hedging in c with a non-
adjusted proﬁt-maximizing contract from the previous period yields δc( ˜ pc−1(z)).
Inthemoderatescenario, weobservethatnon-adjustedoptimalandproﬁt-maximizing
contracts, based on index 1, 2 and 3 generate positive proﬁts. These proﬁts, Π75/25(pt(z))
= 145.8 − 310.1 CHF/ha and, respectively, Πi( ˜ pt(z)) = 192.9 − 375.9 CHF/ha, are sub-
stantially higher than the proﬁts from the adjusted proﬁt-maximizing contracts.
Π75/25( ˜ p75/25(z)) ranges between = 74.8 to 112.5 CHF/ha depending on the index. In
contrast, the non-adjusted contracts based on Index 4 generate negative proﬁts (−260.6
to −332.8 CHF/ha, depending on the type of contract) for the insurer. At the same time,
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δ75/25(pt(z)) is between −2.42% and −6.98%, for Index 1, 2 and 3. The non-adjusted
proﬁt-maximizing contract makes the insured in the moderate scenario even worse off,
i.e. δ75/25( ˜ pt(z)) is between −3.82% and −8.95% for contracts based on Index 1, 2, and 3.
Therefore, contracts 1, 2, and 3 would not be bought by the insured.
Hedging with an adjusted contract, δ75/25(p75/25(z)), in contrast generates positive
hedging beneﬁts of 2.23 − 3.31% (depending on the index). With the non-adjusted con-
tracts based on Index 4, which generate a 4-times higher δc than the corresponding ad-
justed contract, the insured’s crop losses would be overcompensated. Since this contract
generates losses of −260.6 to −332.8 CHF/ha (depending on the type of contract), it will
however not be offerd by the insurer.
Figure 9: Proﬁts (in CHF/ha) for adjusted (blue) and non-adjusted, optimal contracts
(pink, solid line) and non-adjusted, proﬁt-maximizing (pink, dashed line) are shown
over time for all indices. The Πc from hedging with an optimal non-adjusted contract
Πc(pc−1(z)) is derived by determining the expected proﬁts in climatic scenario c from of-
fering an optimal contract (pc−1(z)) from the previous period c − 1. The Πc from offering
a non-adjusted proﬁt-maximizing contract from the previous period yields Πc( ˜ pc−1(z)).
The situation changes in the medium scenario. For all indices, δ50/50(p75/25(z)) takes
on values that are higher than δ50/50(p50/50(z)) from the adjusted contracts. The hedg-
ing effectiveness of the non-adjusted contract 3 (6.55%) is almost twice as high as for the
corresponding adjusted contracts (3.86%), and the non-adjusted proﬁt-maximizing con-
tract yields almost the same hedging beneﬁts (3.76%) as the adjusted contract (3.85%). All
non-adjusted optimal contrasts generate losses for the insurer.
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While the non-adjusted optimal contracts generate losses for the insured, some non-
adjusted proﬁt-maximizing contracts (based on Index 2 and 4) generate positive proﬁts.
Expected proﬁts for non-adjusted proﬁt-maximizing contracts, Πf( ˜ p75/25(z)), range be-
tween 13.8 and 46.4 CHF/ha (depending on the index). In addition, we observe that the
insured is (almost) indifferent between the non-adjusted proﬁt-maximizing contract and
the adjusted optimal contract.35 Since δ50/50( ˜ p75/25(z)) and Π50/50( ˜ p75/25(z)) are both
positive, these non-adjusted contracts would be traded. We observe this pattern also in
the future scenario.
In the future scenario, both non-adjusted contracts generate a higher δc than the ad-
justed contract. The non-adjusted optimal contract produces a higher δc than the non-
adjusted proﬁt-maximizing contract. Given that expected proﬁts for the non-adjusted op-
timal contracts, ∏f(p25/75(z)), is negative, these contracts will not be offered. The insurer
could generate positive proﬁts by offering the non-adjusted proﬁt-maximizing contracts,
as they yield a positive risk reduction. In the future scenario, δf( ˜ pf(z)) is 5.42%, while
δf( ˜ p25/75(z)) is 4.92%. We observe however for all climatic scenarios that the standard
deviation of δc(pc−1(z)), or respectively δc( ˜ pc−1(z)), is bigger than the standard devia-
tion of δc(pc(z)). For the insured, this implies that insuring with non-adjusted contracts
is more risky compared to hedging with an adjusted contract.
While expected proﬁts from non-adjusted proﬁt-maximizing contracts are positive
(in the medium and future scenario, for certain indices), they are signiﬁcantly smaller
than the proﬁts from offering adjusted proﬁt-maximizing contracts. Non-adjusted proﬁt-
maximizingcontractsinthefuturescenariogenerateproﬁtsof13.8to46.4CHF/ha, which
reﬂects approximately the expected proﬁts in today’s conditions. By offering an adjusted
contract, the insurer could generate proﬁts that are 3 times higher. Πf(pf(z)) ranges
between 88.2 and 163.3 CHF/ha. The standard deviation for all non-adjusted contracts
is also quite large compared to the standard deviation of the adjusted contracts. Thus,
offering non-adjusted contracts is more risky than offering adjusted proﬁt-maximizing
contracts.
To sum up, evaluating the effect of hedging with non-adjusted insurance contracts
for the insured revealed that non-adjusted contracts exist that generate higher hedging
beneﬁts than their adjusted counterparts in certain scenarios (medium, and strong), but
may make the insured worse off in others (future). In some cases, insuring with non-
adjusted contracts may make the insured even worse off than in the situation without
35When taking the standard deviation of δc into account, which is 1.6% for the non-adjusted contract,
compared to 0.11% for the adjusted contract, it turns out that the hedging performance of the non-adjusted
contract is more variable, making the non-adjusted contracts less attractive.
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Table 14: Proﬁts (in CHF/ha) for adjusted and non-adjusted contracts
Index 1 Index 2 Index 3 Index 4
today adjusted optimal 41.61 61.29 58.78 67.29
(std) 4.24 5.84 4.96 6.42
moderate adjusted optimal 74.80 103.08 100.94 112.56
(std) 6.1 5.9 6.0 5.3
non-adjusted optimal 145.8 310.1 257.7 -332.8
(std) 36.4 39.6 42.6 93.4
proﬁt 192.9 375.9 321.1 -260.6
(std) 36.4 39.7 42.7 93.5
medium adjusted optimal 89.51 126.93 125.62 137.32
(std) 2.94 3.85 3.58 4.64
non-adjusted optimal -212.8 -79.1 -91.0 -57.1
(std) 51.6 44.3 54.7 65.0
proﬁt -146.4 13.0 0.15 45.0
(std) 51.6 44.3 54.6 65.0
strong adjusted optimal 92.20 142.2 141.48 153.84
(std) 5.32 3.23 3.51 3.43
non-adjusted optimal -102.8 -135.4 -132.5 -140.7
(std) 36.83 16.8 36.2 48.8
proﬁt -12.6 -47.7 -11.5 -9.6
(std) 36.7 17.1 36.2 48.7
future adjusted optimal 88.28 149.56 149.20 163.30
(std) 8.0 7.42 8.30 8.0
non-adjusted optimal -71.9 -95.6 -97.0 -140.6
(std) 53.1 31.0 92.5 61.3
proﬁt 19.8 46.4 44.4 13.8
(std) 53.0 30.8 92.2 61.1
Note: Expected proﬁts from adjusted and non-adjusted contracts (in CHF/ha) for all indices are shown
over time, together with the standard deviation Expected proﬁts from non-adjusted contracts (Πc(pc−1),
or Πc( ˜ pc−1), ) in a given climatic scenario (c) are derived by calculating the net-payments from offering an
optimal (pc−1(z)), or a proﬁt-maximizing (˜ pc−1(z)) insurance contract from the previous climatic conditions
(c − 1) in c. Crop: maize, location: SHA, model parameters: ny = 25, nz = 50, bw(1)=100, bw(2)=300,
and σ = 2.
insurance (moderate).
Weshowthatnon-adjustedcontractsthatgenerateahigherhedgingeffectivenessthan
their adjusted contracts are not going to be offered by the insurer as these contracts create
losses. Similarly, for the situation where expected proﬁts from non-adjusted contracts
are higher than proﬁts from adjusted contracts (moderate), an evaluation of the hedging
effectiveness shows that these contracts (based on Index 1, 2, and 3) produce a negative
δ. These contracts would re-distribute wealth from the insured to the insurer and the
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insured would not by them. As a result, insurers may not be able to sell non-adjusted
weather insurance contracts any longer.
Focusing on non-adjusted contracts that produce simultaneously positive proﬁts and
hedging beneﬁts, we ﬁnd that the insurer (and the insured) could be better off with an
adjusted proﬁt-maximizing contract (optimal contract), because these contracts generate
on average similar expected proﬁts (expected δ) at a lower standard deviation. By not
adapting weather insurance contracts on time, insurers face the risk of huge losses (as in
the strong scenario), and the risk reduction for the insured is no longer guaranteed (as in
the moderate scenario).
7 Conclusion and Outlook
We shed light on the consequences of using historical data for designing (and pricing)
weather insurance products for the resulting hedging effectiveness for the insured, and
the proﬁtability for insurers. The objective of this paper is twofold: First, we evaluate
the potential of using weather insurance to manage the climate change induced increase
in weather risk. A process-based crop simulation model is used to simulate crop yield
data for today’s weather conditions, and for a climate change scenario for the time period
2036-2065. The stationarity assumption is not valid for the yield and weather data used
in this study. We simulate adjusted weather insurance contracts for today’s and future
climatic conditions using an insurance model developed by Kapphan (2011). Adjusted
insurance contracts are developed using weather data that represents the weather risk to
be hedged. We ﬁnd that the payoff function of adjusted contracts changes its shape over
time, and that adjusted contracts are deﬁned over a wider range of so far unprecedented
realizations of the weather index. For stylized (linear) weather derivatives, our ﬁndings
imply that insurance parameters (trigger level, tick size, and cap) have to be adjusted over
time to effectively hedge future weather risk.
We show that the increase in weather risk due to climate change generates a huge
potential for the weather insurance industry. In particular, we ﬁnd that the insurance
industry can expect proﬁts to increase by up to 240% (depending on the contract) when
offering adjusted contracts. At the same time, the beneﬁts in terms of risk reduction from
hedging with adjusted weather insurance contracts almost triple for the insured.
Second, we analyze the effect of offering non-adjusted risk management products to
cope with the expected increase in weather risk in light of climate change, i.e. we take
into account that the insurance industry prices and designs contracts using historical
(backward-looking) data, despite the fact that the stationarity assumption is no longer
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valid. We demonstrate that the payoff function of weather insurance products requires
regular updating in times of climate change in order to guarantee that the product de-
livers the expected hedging beneﬁts. Otherwise, we ﬁnd that non-adjusted contracts ei-
ther create substantial losses, or that proﬁts from non-adjusted contracts are substantially
smaller than proﬁts from the corresponding adjusted contracts. While increasing the pre-
miums of today’s insurance products helps insurers build up liquidity that can be used
to cover the increase in future indemnities, this is not sufﬁcient in order to provide clients
with adequate risk management products. In contrast to damage-based insurance prod-
ucts, parametric insurance products require in addition that contract characteristics are
regularly adapted in light of climate change.
Our results are driven by the changes in the distribution of the underlying weather in-
dex. These changes affect the frequency and extent of payments. Adjusted insurance con-
tracts account for the new climatic conditions by providing higher payments at a higher
frequency, and in return charge a higher premium. With non-adjusted contracts, we ob-
serve that (depending on the index and the climatic conditions), the insured is either over-
or under-compensated relative to the payments needed to cover the actual loss. The dif-
ferent patterns in which payout probabilities of non-adjusted contracts change (relative
to the adjusted contracts), cannot be attributed to particular climatic conditions, since
multi-peril weather indices were used to predict crop yields. More research is required
to analyze how climate change is affecting the risk reduction from univariate weather
indices, and how to best adapt (simple) insurance contracts.
Our results have been derived by studying the effect of a single climate change sce-
nario, on one crop, at one geographical location. Future research should extend the
methodology outlined in this paper to other crops and other regions using multiple cli-
mate projections to assess the effect of climate change on insurance design and risk re-
duction. The use of a process-based crop simulation in combination with climate pro-
jections represents one possible method for dealing with non-stationary yield data. In
future work, statistical methods for dealing with non-stationary time series data should
be used to replicate our approach for evaluating the effect of hedging with non-adjusted
insurance contracts.
Climate change projections are informed by General Circulation Models (GCM) and
Regional Circulation Models (RCM), which are subject to uncertainty due to a number
of factors such as the representation of the physical system, or the future boundary con-
ditions which depend on the global economic development. From a risk management
perspective, the state of the art knowledge on generating local climate change projections
shouldbeusedtodeterminetheeffectofuncertaintyinanthropogenicwarmingestimates
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on our results, i.e. the effect of emission scenario uncertainty, as well as GCM/RCM
model uncertainty on the simulated insurance contract, and respectively the effect of the
uncertainty on the hedging effectiveness.
Climate change projections are informed by General Circulation Models (GCM) and
Regional Circulation Models (RCM), which are subject to uncertainties in model struc-
ture, assumptions about emission pathways, model parameter values and input data.
These uncertainties propagate to the crop model, which is subject to very similar un-
certainties in itself. In general, not all processes and process interactions affecting crop
growth can be fully represented with a process-based crop model. For example, indirect
weather-related impacts of pests and diseases are not considered. Also, the calibration of
crop parameters is subject to uncertainty. Even if a crop model was found to reﬂect the
patterns of observed yields reasonably well under current climate conditions, it cannot
be evaluated how reliable the predictions for changed climate conditions are. In this con-
text it has to be noted that possible impacts of CO2 increase were not considered in this
study. Future work should investigate how sensitive the derived weather indices are to
uncertainties in climate projections, crop model parameters and model assumptions. Fur-
thermore, it should be analyzed how such uncertainties affect the hedging effectiveness
of adjusted contracts.
8 Appendix
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Figure 10: Optimal contracts (dashed line) with standard deviation (solid lines) for to-
day’s (green) and future (red) climatic conditions for all indices.
Figure 11: Optimal (solid line) and proﬁt-maximizing (dashed line) insurance contracts
for Index 1 with density, for today’s (green) and future (red) climatic conditions.
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Figure 12: Optimal (solid line) and proﬁt-maximizing (dashed line) insurance contracts
for Index 3 with density, for today’s (green) and future (red) climatic conditions.
Figure 13: Optimal (solid line) and proﬁt-maximizing (dashed line) insurance contracts
for Index 4 with density, for today’s (green) and future (red) climatic conditions.
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Figure 14: Transition of boxplots from the income distributions without and with optimal
insurance, for Index 3
Figure 15: Income distributions with optimal (solid line) and proﬁt-maximizing (dashed
line) insurance, for all indices, and without insurance (pointed line) for today’s and future
climatic conditions.
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Table 16: Descriptive statistics of weather indices
Climatic scenarios today Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 future
1981-2001 moderate medium strong 2036-2065
Index 1
mean 3792 3700 3591 3477 3381
std 346.1 456.7 517.7 531.7 558.9
skewness 0.450 0.091 0.359 0.396 0.831
Index 2
mean 3785 3705 3589 3477 3369
std 400.4 533.7 635.6 681.4 720.4
skewness 0.428 0.023 0.131 0.271 0.553
Index 3
mean 3779 3700 3585 3478 3371
std 386.7 524.9 631.3 677.9 718.9
skewness 0.401 -0.125 0.015 0.209 0.425
Index 4
mean 3797 3696 3588 3468 3353
std 467.1 563.1 665.2 714.3 729.9
skewness -0.274 -0.453 -0.105 0.112 0.316
Note: Mean (in kg/ha), standard deviation (in kg/ha), and skewness of all weather indices for all climatic
scenarios
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Table 17: Descriptive analysis of income distribution with and without insurance
Climatic Today Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Future
scenarios 1981-2001 moderate medium strong 2036-2065
mean no insurance 3.696 3.598 3.497 3.387 3.294
(CHF/ha) optimal 3.696 3.598 3.497 3.387 3.294
proﬁt 3.630 3.497 3.371 3.245 3.145
std no insurance 186.3 273.3 300.3 301.1 279.4
(CHF/ha) optimal 120.0 130.9 137.0 141.3 146.3
proﬁt 120.1 130.9 137.0 141.3 146.5
skew no insurance -0.222 -0.813 -0.375 -0.020 0.061
optimal -0.03 0.019 0.09 -0.12 -0.01
proﬁt -0.03 0.019 0.09 -0.12 -0.01
quantile no insurance 3.449 3.210 3.083 2.998 2.937
10% optimal 3.541 3.435 3.323 3.207 3.109
proﬁt 3.475 3.334 3.198 3.065 2.959
25% no insurance 3.574 3.455 3.267 3.168 3.106
optimal 3.611 3.509 3.402 3.288 3.194
proﬁt 3.545 3.408 3.276 3.146 3.045
50% no insurance 3.704 3.640 3.534 3.385 3.292
optimal 3.697 3.598 3.492 3.392 3.297
proﬁt 3.631 3.497 3.366 3.250 3.146
75% no insurance 3.835 3.791 3.724 3.611 3.485
optimal 3.777 3.684 3.586 3.484 3.398
proﬁt 3.711 3.584 3.461 3.343 3.248
90% no insurance 3.932 3.911 3.858 3.787 3.644
optimal 3.852 3.764 3.671 3.556 3.482
proﬁt 3.787 3.663 3.545 3.415 3.332
Note: Statistical moments of the income distribution without insurance and for the situation with optimal
and proﬁt-maximizing insurance for all climatic scenarios.
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